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Abstract What entitles you to rely on information received from others?
What entitles you to rely on information retrieved from your own memory?
Intuitively, you are entitled simply to trust yourself, while you should monitor
others for signs of untrustworthiness. This article makes a case for inverting the
intuitive view, arguing that metacognitive monitoring of oneself is fundamental
to the reliability of memory, while monitoring of others does not play a
significant role in ensuring the reliability of testimony.
1 Introduction
Sperber et al. (2010) have recently argued that humans are “epistemically
vigilant” with respect to information communicated by other agents—roughly,
that, given the evolutionary stability of communication, and given that it
is often in the communicator’s interest to deceive the receiver, receivers
must have a capacity to filter out dishonest communicated information. This
descriptive account dovetails, as I argue below, with the normative account
defended by Fricker (1994, 1995) in the epistemology of testimony, according
to which, while an agent is epistemically entitled to trust herself, she is not
so entitled simply to trust the testimony of other agents but is required to
monitor testifiers for dishonesty. Drawing on empirical and evolutionary work
on communication and memory, this article argues that this “vigilantist” line
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gets things backwards: while agents neither need nor have a capacity for
effective vigilance with respect to communicated information, they both need
and have such a capacity with respect to internally generated information.
Section 2 reviews the theoretical framework employed throughout the
paper. Section 3 briefly reviews vigilantism about testimony, and Section 4
argues that it should be rejected. Section 5 then develops a case for a form
of vigilantism about memory and related internal sources.
2 The Metacognitive Epistemology Framework
My argument against vigilantism relies on a metacognitive epistemology
framework (MEF) developed elsewhere (Michaelian 2012c, 2011c); this sec-
tion briefly reviews the framework, showing how it can be extended to
testimony via the concept of social metacognition.
2.1 Explaining Reliability
MEF foregrounds the explanatory question of how agents achieve epis-
temically acceptable belief-formation despite their dependence on imperfect
information sources, focussing on the role of metacognitive monitoring in
compensating for the limitations of such sources.
My focus here is on memory and testimony, and hence on metamemory and
deception detection (which I treat as a form of social metacognition, playing a
role analogous to that played by metamemory). The apparent analogy between
memory and testimony make it useful to discuss them together. Typically,
both are seen as purely “transmissive” sources, capable of preserving but not
generating new justification/knowledge (Burge 1993; Senor 2007; Bernecker
2008). While this is not, strictly speaking, right (Lackey 2008; Matthen 2010;
Michaelian 2011a, 2012b), the apparent analogy nevertheless provides a useful
starting point, due in part to the way it breaks down. While reductionism,
according to which the agent is not entitled simply to trust the deliverances
of the relevant source but rather requires positive reason for doing so, is
intuitively plausible in the case of testimony (Fricker 1994, 1995; Michaelian
2008) (though of course there are many defences of antireductionism about
testimony in the literature, e.g., Burge 1993; Coady 1992), a form of antireduc-
tionism, according to which the agent is entitled to trust the deliverances of the
source without requiring positive reason to do so, is intuitively plausible in the
case of memory (Bernecker 2010). My argument here supports an inversion of
this default position: I claim that, while the testimony/memory analogy does
break down, it does so in an unexpected way, with agents requiring positive
reason to trust memory but not testimony.
I set other internal sources, including perception and reasoning, aside. While
research on metamemory (Dunlosky and Bjork 2008) and deception detection
(Vrij 2008) is advanced, there is relatively little work on metaperception (Levin
2002; Loussouarn 2010), and consequently our understanding of metapercep-
Author's personal copy
(Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust 483
tion is simply too limited at this point to enable us to discuss its epistemic
role with much confidence. And while there is much work on metareasoning
(Anderson et al. 2006; Cox 2005; Thompson 2010), metareasoning appears to
play a role rather different from that played by other forms of metacognition:
metareasoning seems to be primarily about allocating resources, choosing
strategies, determining when to terminate a given strategy, etc. rather than
about determining whether to accept/reject the product of a given cognitive
process (though fluency does play a role here Oppenheimer 2008)—that is,
about self-probing, rather than post-evaluation (Proust 2008). MEF would
thus have to be extended significantly in order to take the epistemic role of
metareasoning into account. This is anyway necessary, given that metamemory
can also play a self-probing role (e.g., the feeling of knowing can determine
whether the agents continues to attempt to retrieve a record Koriat 1998;
de Sousa 2008; Dokic 2013), but it is a separate project.
The normative component of MEF incorporates process reliabilism about
justification (Goldman 1979): the degree of justification of a belief is deter-
mined by the reliability of the process that produces it, where the reliability of a
process is defined as its tendency to produce a given ratio of true beliefs to total
(true and false) beliefs. I assume that epistemically acceptable belief-formation
requires a high level of reliability. MEF also makes room for other epistemic
desiderata, especially power and speed (drawing inspiration from Goldman
1992; Cummins et al. 2004; Lepock 2007), incorporating these into a broadly
virtue-reliabilist framework (Sosa 2007). The core idea is that an appropriate
balance of reliability, power, and speed, where the appropriate balance is
determined by the function of the relevant cognitive system together with the
agent’s current context, including such factors as the relative importance of
forming true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs, is required for virtuous belief-
formation. I discuss power and speed briefly below, but my focus here is largely
on reliability.
MEF focusses on belief-producing processes with a two-level structure, in
which an information source produces representations that, by default, come
to serve as belief-contents and an endorsement mechanism determines whether
to endorse or reject produced representations—the endorsement mechanism
in effect functions as a filter on the information source. It is useful to conceive
of the endorsement mechanism as employing a set of criteria for evaluating
produced representations, together with a rule determining whether a given
representation is to be evaluated as accurate given the extent to which it
satisfies these criteria; this rule can be flexible, requiring greater or lesser
satisfaction of the criteria according to the agent’s current context, thus
allowing trade-offs among reliability, power, and speed.
The way in which the reliability R of a two-level process is determined
can be understood using a modified version of a probability model originally
developed by Park and Levine to understand what determines deception
detection accuracy (Park and Levine 2001). Assuming that a representation is
endorsed only if it is evaluated as accurate, R is determined as follows, where T
means that the information source produces an accurate representation and H
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means that the endorsement mechanism evaluates the representation as being
accurate:
R = P(H&T)/P(H&T) + P(H& ∼ T) (1)
This is just the ratio of accurate evaluations of representations as accurate
to total (accurate and inaccurate) evaluations of representations as accurate.
P(H&T) and P(H& ∼ T) are determined by the base rate P(T) of accurate
representations produced by the source and the sensitivity of the endorsement
mechanism to accuracy and inaccuracy, P(H|T) and P(∼ H| ∼ T).
Figure 1 illustrates two key points that can be made using this probability
model: (1) if the endorsement mechanism is sufficiently sensitive (high P(H|T)
and P(∼ H| ∼ T)), a reliable information source is unnecessary—effective
monitoring renders reliable content-production unnecessary for reliable belief-
production; (2) if the base rate of accurate representations is sufficiently high
(high P(T)), a sensitive endorsement mechanism is unnecessary—reliable
content-production renders effective monitoring unnecessary for reliable
belief-production. Both points are straightforward but worth making explicitly,
since they have typically been neglected in the epistemologies of memory and
testimony.
Fig. 1 Illustration of how the reliability of a two-level belief-producing process is determined by
the interaction between the base rate of accurate representations produced by its information
source and the sensitivity of its endorsement mechanism to the accuracy/inaccuracy of those
representations. A highly sensitive endorsement mechanism can compensate for a low base rate,
whereas a high base rate can compensate for an insensitive endorsement mechanism. If the agent
trusts the information source blindly, accepting all incoming representations, reliability is simply
determined by the base rate. In the case of testimony, our actual monitoring is barely sensitive, so
that a high base rate of honest testimony is necessary for reliable belief-production (see Section 4)
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2.2 The Role of Metacognition
In general, the role of the endorsement mechanism should be understood in
terms of metacognition. (Metacognition appears to be evolutionarily recent,
restricted to humans and perhaps a few other species Metcalfe 2008; Smith
et al. 2003; Proust 2006, so we should expect that non-metacognitive animals
will not in general have two-level systems.) Classically understood (Nelson and
Narens 1994), metacognition refers to the monitoring and control of mental
processes: a meta-level monitors an object-level, updating its model of the
latter, on the basis of which it controls the activity of the object-level. Since
endorsement is a matter of control, a two-level system is metacognitive if
endorsement decisions are based on information received by the endorsement
mechanism about the operation of the information producer.
We can distinguish among three types of information about the object-level
to which an endorsement mechanism can have access: (1) general knowledge
about the source, e.g., about its overall reliability; (2) information about the
operation of the source during the production of a given representation, e.g.,
the speed with which the representation was produced; (3) information about a
produced representation itself, e.g., about features of its content or its relation
to other representations. We can refer to metacognition based on the latter
two types of information as cue-based and to metacognition based on the
first type as knowledge-based.1 Cue-based metacognition is typically a type
1 (automatic, heuristic, unconscious, fast) process, while knowledge-based
metacognition is typically a type 2 (systematic, reflective, conscious, slow)
process (Evans 2008; Frankish 2010).
The basic structure of a metacognitive belief-producing process is sum-
marised in Fig. 2.
MEF treats testimony as an epistemic source on a par with internal
sources, with monitoring for cues to deception viewed as a form of social
metacognition.2 I discuss monitoring for cues in Section 4; here, I discuss
the more controversial move of treating receipt of testimonial information
as analogous to receipt of representations produced by internal sources, as a
process which, by default, leads to endorsement and hence production of a
belief having the relevant representation as its content. (Default endorsement
is compatible with vigilance—the claim that endorsement is the default means
that agents tend to endorse received information if monitoring, assuming that
it is engaged, does not produce reason to reject it.)
1The cue-based/knowledge-based distinction is not quite the same as Koriat’s distinction between
experience-based and theory-based metacognition (Koriat 2006), since there is no requirement
that sensitivity to cues manifest itself in the form of a feeling.
2Jost et al. (1998) also refer to social metacognition, but they justify this by employing an extremely
broad definition of metacognition as involving “any aspect of thinking about thinking”, a definition
so broad as to include many entirely disparate phenomena; my conception of social metacognition
is much narrower.
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Fig. 2 Basic structure of a generic metacognitive belief producing process
Reid famously suggested that we have “a disposition to confide in the
veracity of others, and to believe what they tell us” (Reid 1764, p. 238–40).
This suggestion would license a picture on which the receipt of testimony
tends by default to eventuate in the production of the corresponding belief.
While Reid’s suggestion is speculative, the work of Gilbert and his colleagues
(Gilbert et al. 1990, 1993; Gilbert 1991) provides some support for it. Gilbert
argues that belief-formation is not a separate step following comprehension
but rather inevitably accompanies comprehension, with rejection being an
optional later step:
Findings from a multitude of research literatures converge on a single
point: People are credulous creatures who find it very easy to believe
and very difficult to doubt. In fact, believing is so easy, and perhaps so
inevitable, that it may be more like involuntary comprehension than it is
like rational assessment. (Gilbert 1991, p. 117).
Since Sperber et al. (2010) challenge the evidence for Gilbert’s view, citing
studies (Hasson et al. 2005; Richter et al. 2009) that suggest that the tendency
for automatic acceptance is overcome when the communicated information is
relevant to the recipient, however, it risks being question-begging to rely on
Gilbert in this context.
While I will not respond respond to the details of the Sperber et al.
critique of Gilbert’s view here, I take it to be shown by work by deception
researchers on the truth bias, defined as the tendency of recipients to evaluate
messages as honest regardless of actual message honesty (Park and Levine
2001; McCornack and Parks 1986; Levine et al. 1999, 2006; Bond and DePaulo
2008; Levine and Kim 2010), that a picture along roughly Gilbertian/Reidian
lines must be right, whether or not the details of Gilbert’s view are right.
This work shows clearly that, while “truth-bias varies in degree from person
to person and situation to situation”, “most people are truth-biased most of
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the time” (Levine and Kim 2010). Levine and Kim cite several factors which
might together explain the truth bias, including belief as a mental default
(basically Gilbert’s picture), the necessity of truth bias for communication
(drawing on Grice 1989), and the necessity of truth bias for social interaction;
I offer an alternative explanation, in terms of the costs of deception, in
Section 4.3.2. Whatever the details of the mechanism(s) giving rise to the
truth bias, however, the existence of the bias is enough to justify treating
endorsement of testimonial information as the default, with monitoring for
cues to deception then playing a filtering role analogous to that played by
metamemory with respect to information retrieved from memory.
This allows MEF to treat belief-formation in memory and testimony as
analogous, as far as the structure of the relevant processes is concerned. Mem-
ory: Memory retrieval is the information source, with retrieved (apparent)
memories endorsed by default. The agent might monitor his memory, the
production of the relevant memory representation, or the representation itself.
Monitoring is typically a cue-based, type 1 process. The reliability of memory
belief-formation is determined by the interaction between (1) the base rate
of accurate apparent memories and (2) the sensitivity of the agent to the
accuracy/inaccuracy of apparent memories. Testimony: The communicator is
the information source. The receiver monitors the communicator, the produc-
tion of the relevant utterance, or the utterance itself. Setting aside monitoring
of the speaker himself (knowledge-based metacognition), which plays a rel-
atively minor role (see Section 4), what matters is cue-based monitoring of
the production of the utterance or of the utterance itself; this will normally
be accomplished by type 1 processes. The reliability of testimonial belief-
formation is determined by the interaction of (1) the base rate of accurate
testimony and (2) the sensitivity of the receiver to the accuracy/inaccuracy of
received testimony.
3 Vigilantism About Testimony
This section provides an overview of vigilantism about testimony; Section 4
then applies MEF to argue against vigilantism.
I do not mean to assimilate Sperber et al.’s view on epistemic vigilance to
Fricker’s brand of local reductionism. Fricker and Sperber can be grouped
together under the heading of vigilantism, despite the fact that they focus on
somewhat different questions, because their positions are representative of a
certain broad view of the epistemic role of communicated information. On this
view, testimony is to be sharply distinguished from internal epistemic sources:
it is, in some sense, less reliable than internal sources and thus requires a level
of surveillance not required by internal sources. This view has a good deal of
intuitive plausibility, for, as Sperber points out, while other agents regularly
have an incentive to deceive us, presumably our own internal information
sources do not.
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Fricker focusses on a pair of related epistemological questions: Is it neces-
sary to monitor in order to form justified testimonial beliefs? Is it possible to
monitor in a way that permits formation of justified testimonial beliefs? While
these questions are normative, they are, to the extent that we take justification
to be a matter of reliability, at the same time descriptive, and they are thus
very close to Sperber’s descriptive question about the role of monitoring in
the formation of testimonial beliefs. While Sperber et al. are not interested
primarily in the role of monitoring in generating epistemic justification, they
are interested in the role of monitoring in determining the reliability of
testimonial belief-formation, and this is enough to license grouping the two
positions together under the heading of vigilantism—ultimately, similar claims
about the capacity of monitoring to filter out deceptive testimony are at the
heart of the two positions.
Fricker’s and Sperber’s arguments focus on what Fricker refers to as trust-
worthiness, where an agent’s testimony is trustworthy on a given occasion
when she is both honest and competent with respect to the topic of her
testimony on that occasion. Sperber assumes that agents are largely competent:
“individual mechanisms are, under normal conditions and in the absence of
social interference, reliable sources of true beliefs” (Sperber 2001) (see also
Sperber et al. 2010, p. 359). I will likewise assume that agents’ individual belief-
forming processes are reliable, an assumption licensed by basic evolutionary
considerations (McKay and Dennett 2009), therefore focussing on honesty
rather than competence. Similarly, with Sperber, I assume that testimonial
beliefs, like other beliefs, must in general be true to be advantageous: just
as we can set aside non-testimonial cases in which biased belief-formation
is beneficial (e.g., self-enhancement Alicke and Sedikides 2009) as being
marginal, we can set aside cases in which acceptance of inaccurate testimony is
beneficial (e.g., exaggerated warnings Sperber 2001).
Both Sperber and Fricker assign a role to type 2 deception detection: recip-
ients will sometimes have antecedent reason not to trust the relevant speaker
(on the relevant occasion, on the relevant topic), and they will sometimes
later discover that the speaker lied. But, in practice, such knowledge-based
deception detection appears to play a relatively minor role. First, it seems likely
that lies are relatively seldom detected be means of antecedent knowledge, for,
in most cases, we simply lack the necessary antecedent knowledge: we often
receive testimony from speakers about whom we have little or no information;
moreover, even when we have some information about the speaker, this need
not tell us whether he is likely to be honest on a given occasion, since honesty
is determined as much by situational factors as the agent’s dispositions, so
that past honesty provides a poor guide to future honesty. Second, it seems
likely that lies are relatively seldom detected after the fact, when the speaker
discovers the deception by other means (information received from others,
physical evidence, etc.). Many lies will go undetected, since there is no relevant
evidence. In certain cases, even when evidence is available, the subject might
(for a variety of reasons) more or less actively avoid discovering a lie (Vrij
2008). Finally, poor source memory raises an addition problem for after-the-
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fact lie detection: even if the subject discovers after the fact that the source was
dishonest, the belief resulting from acceptance of the testimony can persist
(Kumkale and Albarracín 2004). I therefore set knowledge-based detection
aside here, focussing on cue-based detection occurring at the time at which the
relevant utterance is received.3
3.1 Local Reductionism
Fricker4 contrasts her local reductionism with antireductionism, the thesis,
roughly, that agents are entitled to assume trustworthiness (and so honesty),
and therefore to form a testimonial belief, absent special reason not to.
According to reductionism in general, the agent must have positive reason to
hold that the testifier is trustworthy and therefore to form a belief by accepting
his testimony; according to local reductionism in particular, the agent acquires
such reason by monitoring the testifier for signs of untrustworthiness, including
dishonesty. Thus, while antireductionism licenses what we can refer to as a
policy of blind trust, local reductionism requires what we can refer to as a
monitoring policy, a policy of refraining from the formation of testimonial
belief unless one has monitored the speaker for signs of untrustworthiness,
and unless no such signs have been found.
Against antireductionism, Fricker argues that a policy of blind trust is a
recipe for gullibility, unreliability.5 She therefore concludes that subjects must,
if they are to form justified testimonial beliefs, use the monitoring policy. She
argues, moreover, that we do in fact use the monitoring policy, and that the
policy is effective, that is, that it actually enables us to screen out untrustworthy
testimony, thus enabling reliable testimonial belief production in the face of
unreliable testimony.
In order for these two arguments to work, Fricker requires several empirical
assumptions about lying:
A1 Dishonest testimony is frequent, so that blindly accepting testimony
would lead to unreliable testimonial belief-formation, due to acceptance
of dishonest and therefore false testimony.
A2 Reliable cues to dishonesty exist.
3As Gelfert has argued (Gelfert 2009), reliance on type 2 monitoring may result in local reduc-
tionism collapsing into Reidian credulism, as the sort of innate, subpersonal mechanisms on which
type 2 monitoring relies are the very mechanisms invoked by Reid to explain how testimonial
knowledge is acquired. This objection is compatible with my argument here.
4I rely mainly on Fricker (1994, 1995), but see Fricker (2002, 2004, 2006a, b, c) for recent
developments of the view. I have provided a detailed reconstruction of Fricker’s epistemology
elsewhere Michaelian (2010); I rely on that reconstruction here without defending it.
5While Fricker is an internalist, she acknowledges the importance of reliability, at least as I read
her. I set aside the internalist (coherentist) aspect of her argument, as this is irrelevant given MEF.
There is also a modal aspect to Fricker’s argument—the blindly trusting subject is supposed to be
gullible not only in the sense that her beliefs are formed by an unreliable process but also in the
sense that they are unsafe or insensitive. I set this aspect of the argument aside here, as I have
dealt with it elsewhere Michaelian (2010).
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A3 Subjects can and do effectively monitor for (enough of) these cues, and
not for (too many) false cues. That is, they “look” for appropriate cues,
and they can detect them when they are present.
3.2 Epistemic Vigilance
In addition to their evolutionary argument, Sperber et al. cite a number of
more direct sources of apparent evidence for their view, e.g., experimental
work showing that children show a preference for benevolent informants
(Mascaro and Sperber 2009). While this work is interesting, it is not directly
relevant to the question whether we are vigilant by default: that children
prefer to rely on testimony from informants who are already known to be
benevolent suggests that we are prone to distrust a communicator when we
have antecedent reason to expect her to be dishonest but not that we have any
sensitivity to her dishonesty when we have no such antecedent information. I
therefore focus on their evolutionary argument.6
We can distinguish two main readings of the argument. On the first,
they argue as follows; since it is often in the interests of communicators to
deceive, we should assume that deception is frequent; we should also assume
that testimonial belief-formation is reliable, since, otherwise, it would not be
evolutionarily stable; so we should conclude that receivers are epistemically
vigilant, and, in particular, that they are able to filter out most dishonest
testimony. They are not, however, very explicit on the supposed frequency
of deception. Since it is more conservative not to assume that deception is
frequent, and since, as we shall see, there is evidence that, while deception
does occur regularly, deceptive utterances account for a small fraction of
communication (Levine and Kim 2010; DePaulo et al. 1996; Levine et al.
2010; Serota et al. 2010), there is reason to prefer a reading of the argument
which does not require the assumption that deception is frequent. On this
version of the argument, while deception might be infrequent, nevertheless
it does occur regularly; so agents who effectively monitor for deception will
enjoy an evolutionary advantage; so we should expect to find that agents are
epistemically vigilant with respect to deception.
The empirical presuppositions of Sperber’s view are similar to those of
Fricker’s. The first version of the argument, on which we should expect agents
to be epistemically vigilant with respect to deception because it is often in the
interests of communicators to lie, works only if communicators do in fact lie
frequently, so that blind acceptance of testimony would be unreliable—if the
interest of communicators in lying does not translate into frequent lying, then
blind acceptance of testimony will be reliable, and there will be no need to
screen out dishonest testimony. The argument likewise requires A2 and A3—
otherwise, vigilance will not be effective.
6I rely here on the more detailed critique given in Michaelian (2012a).
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The second version of the argument does not require that deception is fre-
quent enough to render testimonial belief-formation by blind trust unreliable
but only:
A1* Deception occurs regularly.
Only this weak assumption is required for it to be the case that agents who
monitor for deception enjoy an evolutionary advantage. Nor does it require
that cues enabling highly effective monitoring exist or that agents exploit these
to monitor effectively, though it does require:
A2* Cues enabling monitoring good enough to produce some benefit exist.
A3* Subjects can and do monitor for these cues, reliably enough to produce
some benefit.
But because this is an argument about the adaptivity of different possible
mechanisms for testimonial belief-formation, it requires an additional assump-
tion, namely:
A4 The benefits of filtering out deception (when it does occur) outweigh the
costs of monitoring for deception.
4 Against Vigilantism About Testimony
In this section, I argue that, when we assess these assumptions against evidence
from research on human communication, it becomes clear that vigilantism
about testimony is untenable. I begin by focussing on the assumptions required
by Fricker’s argument and the first reading of Sperber’s argument; I then
discuss the assumptions required by the second reading of Sperber’s argument.
4.1 What is the Base Rate of Deception?
A1 says that there is a high base rate of dishonest testimony. The problem here
is straightforward: there are both empirical and theoretical reasons to expect
that the base rate of dishonest testimony is low.
4.1.1 Empirical Evidence
While it is difficult to see how the base rate of deception might be empirically
determined with much accuracy (this parallels the difficulty of determining
the base-rate of accurate representations produced by memory retrieval—see
Section 5.3), existing empirical attempts to get some sense of the frequency
of lying in non-laboratory settings (the base rate is usually set artificially to
50 % in deception detection experiments) all suggest that lying is a regular but
infrequent occurrence, with most people lying infrequently (Levine and Kim
2010; DePaulo et al. 1996; Levine et al. 2010; Serota et al. 2010).
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4.1.2 Theoretical Considerations
While tentative, these findings fit well with what we should expect on evo-
lutionary grounds. In the case of animal signalling, the following reasoning
is more or less standard (Searcy and Nowicki 2005): in order for signalling
to be evolutionarily stable, it must be beneficial not only to senders but also
to receivers, for, if signalling were not beneficial to receivers, they would
stop accepting signals, and consequently signals would stop being given; this
requires that a majority of signals are honest (since usually a signal has to be
honest in order to be useful to the recipient). Discussion then focusses on the
means by which the honesty of signalling is ensured.
One well-known explanation of the honesty of signalling is provided by the
handicap principle, according to which signals are hard to fake because costly,
which guarantees that they will usually be honest, since dishonest signallers
will bear a burden that they cannot support (Grafen 1990; Zahavi and Zahavi
1997). But there are other mechanisms which can also ensure that signals are
mostly honest: a signal can be an index, i.e., its meaning can be tied to its form;
and signalling can be kept honest through deterrents, in which case costs are
paid by dishonest signallers (as opposed to honest signallers, as in the handicap
principle) (Scott-Phillips 2008).
Caution is required when attempting to apply this standard reasoning to
human communication, for, as Sperber points out (Sperber 2001), there are
some important differences between the two cases. First, there is the point
that human communication is typically cheap (unlike, say, the peacock’s tail): it
does not cost much to produce a typical testimonial utterance, so the handicap
principle does not get a grip. That the handicap principle cannot account for
the reliability of communication does not, however, mean that communication
need not be reliable in order to be evolutionarily stable or that its reliability
cannot be explained by the operation of another mechanism. And while the
handicap principle does not get a grip here, deterrence does—I turn to this
point next, exploring the costs of lying (relative to honesty); evidence that lying
is significantly more costly than honesty comes from a variety of sources.
Second, humans have the capacity for theory of mind, which allows them to
engage both in more sophisticated attempts to deceive and in more sophisti-
cated attempts to counter deception. In particular, the mindreading capacity
of receivers can in principle increase their capacity to monitor effectively, and
this might seem to require a change to the basic evolutionary reasoning—if
effective monitoring is available to recipients, they can filter out dishonest
testimony, and so it need not be the case that testimony is honest on average.
This overlooks the point that detection of deception will often result in
punishment of the deceiver, which functions as a deterrent to deception.
More importantly, it overlooks the point (discussed in Section 4.3 below)
that our mindreading capacity does not as a matter of fact enable us reliably
to detect deception. Thus it still needs to be the case that the base rate of
deception is low, despite mindreading—otherwise, communication would not
be advantageous to receivers, and it would collapse.
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Of the available mechanisms, it appears most likely that human communi-
cation is kept honest through deterrents—in particular, that the cognitive, psy-
chological, and social costs of lying mean that lying is, on average, significantly
more costly than honesty.
Cognitive costs of deception Vrij et al. argue that, for a number of reasons
(including the need to generate a coherent lie, the need to monitor the receiver,
and the need to both activate the lie and suppress the truth), deception is
cognitively more costly than honesty (Vrij et al. 2011, p. 28–29). This view
receives support from the work of Vrij’s group showing that lie detection
accuracy is improved when cognitive load is increased (Vrij 2008; Vrij et al.
2011, 2006, 2008), as well as imagining studies showing no area of the brain
more active for honesty than for deception (Christ 2009; Spence and Kaylor-
Hughes 2008; Verschuere et al. 2011). A view of lying as cognitively costly also
fits well with the view that self-deception evolved to facilitate interpersonal
deception, since this claim is supported in part by the point that self-deception
eliminates the cognitive load that would otherwise be involved in other-
deception (von Hippel et al. 2011).
Psychological costs of deception In addition to the cognitive costs of lying,
we should not overlook the point that lying will, in normal agents, have a
“psychological” cost, since we internalize norms that forbid lying, except under
special circumstances. These norms are widespread, apparently pan-cultural:
(The Global Deception Research Team 2006) cites a world values survey
(Inglehart et al. 1998) in which 48 % of respondents said that lying in one’s self-
interest is never justified; a newer version of the survey gives 46 % (Inglehart
et al. 2004). Violation of internalized norms constitutes another disincentive to
lying.
Social costs of deception The existence of norms against lying matters in
another way, since it means that lies, if detected, will often be punished. There
is thus a social cost to lying: though an agent might know in some cases that
his lie will not be detected, he must also, when he is unsure of this, take into
account the losses (damage to relationships, loss of reputation, etc.) that are
likely to occur if a lie is detected.
Summing up: The direct empirical evidence that lying is infrequent, the need
to explain the evolutionary stability of communication, and considerations
suggesting that lying is more costly than truth-telling suggest that, contra A1,
the base rate of deception is low. This means that there is likely no need for
a monitoring mechanism to filter out dishonest testimony in order to achieve
an acceptable level of reliability in testimonial belief-formation—the base rate
P(T) can do all the work. As far as the second version of Sperber’s argument is
concerned, it means that monitoring will have to be not only effective but also
cheap in order to be adaptive (I develop this point below). The assumption
that deception occurs regularly (A1*), however, is clearly safe.
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4.2 Are There Reliable Cues to Deception?
A2 requires the existence of reliable cues to deception, cues that can actually
be used to detect deception in real time. However, based on extensive review
of studies, Vrij (2008) concludes that there are only a small number of cues
to deception, and these are rather weak—the cue sometimes accompanies
deception but not always, and sometimes is present when the communicator
is honest. The same point holds with respect to nonverbal cues. Thus we can
expect that it is difficult for agents to use these cues to detect deception. As Vrij
points out, there are a number of possible explanations for the fact that gen-
uine cues to deception are weak and few, including interpersonal differences
(different subjects behave differently when lying—e.g., lying might be easier
for more intelligent people) and situational factors (different situations induce
different behaviours—e.g., by affecting motivation). But for present purposes,
what matters is only the basic point that there are only a few weak cues to
deception.7
It remains possible, despite this point, that agents manage to exploit the
available cues to monitor effectively for deception. This might occur if they
are sensitive to enough of the genuine cues (and not to too many false cues)
and rely on an appropriate set of cues. So it is not entirely clear whether A2 is
correct (I return to A2* below); as we will see, however, even if it is, A3 is not.
4.3 Is Monitoring for Deception Effective?
A3 says that agents use the available cues to monitor effectively for deception.
Though there are only a few weak cues to deception, agents might neverthe-
less, through monitoring for a combination of cues, exploit the existing cues to
monitor effectively. However, while folk psychology suggests that we are able
to detect deception reasonably well, this intuition is not born out by empirical
work on deception detection.8
4.3.1 Empirical Evidence
In an early review of deception detection studies, Kraut found an average
accuracy rate of 57 % (Kraut 1980); more recently, Vrij estimated 56.6 % (Vrij
2000), while Bond and DePaulo estimated 54 % (Bond and DePaulo 2006); in
the 2008 edition of his book, Vrij gives an accuracy rate of 54.25 % (Vrij 2008).
7Douven and Cuypers (2009) similarly point out that Fricker may overestimate the availability of
cues to untrustworthiness.
8As noted in Section 4.4.1 below, what affects the reliability of testimonial belief formation is not
the overall reliability of evaluations of testimony as honest or dishonest but rather the reliability
specifically of evaluations of testimony as honest; but the finding of poor deception detection
accuracy establishes that monitoring for deception is not effective, so I set this aside for now.
Author's personal copy
(Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust 495
Here, I will follow Vrij in taking accuracy to be around 54 %,9 but the precise
number does not matter for my argument.
A natural worry about this finding is that it is limited to interactions with
unfamiliar communicators: it is plausible that, when we have more background
information about a communicator, we will better be able to detect his lies.
But this is not born out by empirical work—there appears to be no real
difference between deception detection accuracy with respect to strangers and
accuracy with respect to spouses, family members, etc. (Vrij 2008; McCornack
and Parks 1986; Levine et al. 1999; McCornack and Levine 1990; Millar and
Millar 1995; Anderson et al. 2002). This might be because a communicator who
knows the recipient is better able to craft a lie designed to fool that particular
recipient (as Vrij suggests), but the precise explanation does not matter here—
what matters is only that being acquainted with the communicator does not
confer any advantage on the recipient, as far as ability to detect deception is
concerned. Moreover, given the extent of our interactions with communicators
about whom we have no prior information, the objection does not go very far in
challenging the claim that the vigilantist assumption is empirically untenable.
4.3.2 Theoretical Considerations
In other words, deception detection accuracy is consistently found to be
barely above chance—recipients do not succeed in effectively monitoring
communicators for deception, contrary to A3, and thus they cannot filter out
dishonest testimony. This extremely robust finding can be explained in part in
terms of inaccurate folk psychological beliefs about deception and in part in
terms of the operation of the truth bias.
If we assume that an agent’s deception judgements correspond to her beliefs
about cues (Vrij 2008; Forrest et al. 2004), then inaccurate beliefs about cues
can go some way towards explaining poor deception detection accuracy. And
indeed, work on beliefs about cues confirms that folk psychological beliefs
about cues are largely inaccurate—there is little overlap between believed
cues and genuine cues. For example, an ambitious study, involving subjects
in 75 different countries, speaking 43 different languages, identified a cross-
cultural stereotype of a liar, a stereotype which is largely inaccurate (The
Global Deception Research Team 2006): e.g., by far the most commonly-
reported belief about cues to deception is that liars avert their gaze; however,
gaze aversion is not a cue to deception (DePaulo et al. 2003).
Summarizing existing work on beliefs about cues to deception, Vrij points
out that, overall, though there is some overlap, there is little correspondence
between beliefs about cues to deception and actual cues. Of twenty-four “cues”
he considers, folk psychology is right about six. Of these six, however, only
three can serve as genuine cues to deception; the rest bear no relationship
9The accuracy rate needs to be relativized to the base rate of 50 % honest statements; I come back
to this below.
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to deception, and so accurate beliefs here do not aid in deception detection.
In contrast, folk psychology sees many cues where none exist: Vrij identifies
eleven false cues to deception, behaviours that are unrelated to deception but
which are believed to be related to deception. Moreover, folk psychology over-
looks many genuine cues to deception, and in some cases assigns a meaning to
a cue opposite to its real meaning (e.g., liars tend to make few hand and finger
movements, but are believed to make more hand and finger movements).
Given the weakness of the few genuine cues to deception, deception detection
is a difficult task; given the inaccuracy of beliefs about cues, it is unsurprising
that deception detection accuracy is poor.
In addition to inaccurate beliefs about cues, the role of the truth bias
also needs to be taken into account in explaining poor deception detection
accuracy, as Park and Levine and their collaborators have shown in a series of
papers. In order to account for the veracity effect (in which detection accuracy
is a function of message honesty) (Levine et al. 1999), Park and Levine posit
that subjects are in general truth-biased (Park and Levine 2001; Levine et al.
2006; Levine and Kim 2010). Plugging this assumption into their probability
model allows the model to predict deception detection accuracy rates well.
Where H means that the agent judges that the received testimony is honest
and T means that the received testimony is in fact honest, overall deception
detection accuracy is given by P(H&T) + P(∼ H& ∼ T). Reflecting a strong
truth bias, Park and Levine fix P(H|T) = 0.779 and P(∼ H| ∼ T) = 0.349; if
the base rate of honesty is 0.5, the model then predicts an accuracy rate of
about 56 %. Thus the truth bias contributes to explaining the ineffectiveness
of monitoring for deception.
This raises the question of how to account for the existence of the truth
bias itself. Several factors seem to be at work here, including the prevalence
of false beliefs about cues to deception (already discussed above); in addition
to this, we should take into account the costs of monitoring for deception,
which appear to roughly parallel the costs of lying, as well as the adaptivity
of a disposition to judge received messages as honest.
Cognitive costs of monitoring Monitoring requires cognitive resources over
and above those required for mere interpretation of an utterance, so there
will in general be an incentive not to monitor, if possible. Together with the
need to rely on information communicated by others, this can be expected to
contribute to a tendency to evaluate received messages as honest.
Psychological costs of monitoring Just as there are psychological costs in-
volved in lying, there are psychological costs associated with being on the
lookout for deception, and for similar reasons: just as we internalize norms
against lying, we internalize norms against excessive suspicion. Additionally,
being on the lookout for deception might tend to heighten the agent’s aware-
ness of his vulnerability to manipulation through deception—given his inability
to do much about this, it might be preferable for him to be less aware of the
possibility, just as we tend to overestimate ourselves in many other domains.
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Social costs of monitoring The norm against excessive suspicion means that
there can be a social cost to monitoring—if one is seen to be too untrusting, this
can result in social sanctions. Additionally (this is noted by Vrij, among others),
the very rules of polite conversation tend to make monitoring more difficult—
e.g., certain types of questioning can aid in uncovering deception, but these
types of questioning are prohibited in normal conversations. Thus, subjects
have an additional incentive to simply accept communicated information
rather than monitor for dishonesty.
Adaptivity of the truth bias Given that the base rate of deception is low, it is
plausible that a disposition to evaluate received testimony as honest has been
selected for. As Park and Levine point out (Levine et al. 2006), given that
lying is an infrequent occurrence, it is likely adaptive for agents to accept most
received testimony, remaining relatively blind to the possibility of deception.
Evolutionarily speaking, it is not surprising that agents have a built-in tendency
to evaluate received testimony as honest.
4.4 The Limits of Vigilance
The dependence of vigilantism about testimony on inaccurate empirical as-
sumptions means that the view fails. Because vigilantism underestimates the
base rate of honesty and overestimates the effectiveness of monitoring, it
overestimates the gains to be had by monitoring.
4.4.1 The Contribution of the Base Rate
Fricker’s argument and the first version of Sperber’s argument assume that the
base rate of dishonesty is high (A1). We saw in Section 4.1 that this is not the
case, and, as the modified Park-Levine model makes clear, the potential con-
tribution of monitoring diminishes as the base rate of accurate representations
increases. As we have seen, the reliability of testimonial belief-formation is
given by the ratio of P(H&T) to P(H&T) + P(H& ∼ T). And P(H&T) and
P(H& ∼ T), in turn, depend on the base rate of honest testimony, P(T).
As Park and Levine emphasize, it is misleading to say that deception
detection accuracy is about 54 %, for this holds only when the base rate of
honesty is 50 %; because subjects are strongly truth-biased, accuracy is strongly
affected by the base rate. Similarly, as Fig. 1 shows, reliability of honesty
judgements is strongly affected by the base rate, in such a way that there is little
difference between the base rate and the reliability of honesty judgements—R
is only slightly higher than P(T). Thus there is little to be gained by monitoring
and, at high base rates of honesty, accepting all or most received testimony will
result in reliable testimonial belief-formation.
Thus, if the argument given above that the base rate of honesty is high is
right, we can conclude that Fricker is wrong about the need for a reduction
of testimonial justification. We can likewise conclude that the first version of
Sperber’s argument should be rejected: if deception is infrequent, agents need
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not effectively monitor for dishonesty in order for communication to be an
evolutionarily stable strategy. Levine puts the point nicely: “evolving a finely
tuned cognitive system adept at spotting leakage need not be an evolutionary
mandate just because we get duped once in a while” (Levine 2010, p. 55).
4.4.2 The Contribution of Monitoring
As far as the epistemology is concerned, it is good news that the base rate of
lying is low, for our poor ability to detect deception (contra A3) means that a
reduction of testimonial justification is unavailable (agents are not able to filter
out dishonest testimony, whether or not A2 is right)—Fricker’s argument fails.
For the same reason, the first version of Sperber’s argument fails.
Our poor deception detection ability means that the success of the second
version of Sperber’s argument, in contrast, will turn on the costs and benefits
of a policy of epistemic vigilance relative to the alternatives: given the slight
difference between R and P(T), A3* seems to be right (presumably because
A2* is right); the question, then, is whether, as A4 claims, this slight benefit of
monitoring outweighs its costs.
Feasible policies for response to testimony can plausibly be ordered in terms
of how costly they are as follows, from least costly to most costly.
Automatic rejection The cheapest policy is universal rejection, since it re-
quires not only no resources for monitoring for dishonesty but also no re-
sources for interpretation of testimony. Since this policy would deprive the
agent of all testimonial information, it is not a realistic policy—the savings
in terms of cognitive cost would be outweighed by the loss of access to
information communicated by other agents. Thus we do not use this policy.
Automatic acceptance A somewhat more costly but still relatively cheap pol-
icy is automatic acceptance, or blind trust. While this policy, like the remaining
policies, requires resources for interpretation of testimony, it requires no
resources for monitoring. The policy gives the agent access to information
communicated by other agents but leaves him entirely open to manipulation
through deception. Since it cannot account for the slight difference between
P(T) and R (reliability will be the same as the base rate of accuracy—see
Fig. 1), this policy, too, can be ruled out.
Default acceptance A more costly policy is default acceptance, with mon-
itoring triggered only in special circumstances—when something about the
current context (including prior knowledge or easily-noticeable aspects of the
communicator’s behaviour) gives the agent reason to think that the communi-
cator is likely to attempt to deceive him. This policy only occasionally requires
resources for monitoring. The policy gives the agent access to communicated
information and in principle provides him with some protection against manip-
ulation through deception. How good this protection is in practice will depend,
first, on the reliability with which context triggers monitoring on appropriate
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occasions (how likely it is that monitoring is triggered when the communicator
is actually going to lie) and, second, on the reliability of contextually-triggered
monitoring. It seems safe to assume that such contextually-triggered monitor-
ing will be a type 2 process.
Default monitoring The most costly of the feasible policies is the default
monitoring policy, since this always requires resources for monitoring.10 The
policy gives the agent access to communicated information and in principle
provides him with protection against manipulation through deception. How
good this protection is, depends, crucially, on the reliability of default
monitoring. I assume that default monitoring is a type 1 process, though
contextually-triggered type 2 monitoring will also be available to an agent
employing the default monitoring policy.
Excluding the automatic rejection and automatic acceptance policies, what
matters is the cost-benefit ratios of the remaining policies. The question is
whether the difference between P(T) and R is to be explained as the result
of a default monitoring policy or, rather, a policy of default acceptance with
contextually-triggered monitoring.
While Sperber’s argument for default monitoring is tempting, there is
reason to reject it: given that the cues to deception are weak and few, the task
of detecting deception is difficult; thus the expected additional benefit of a
default monitoring policy, relative to a default acceptance policy, is minimal,
and is likely outweighed by the cognitive costs of monitoring. Given that most
received messages are honest, it is adaptive to tend to simply assume that
received messages are honest, rather than to waste resources in an attempt to
determine whether they are honest. Moreover, default acceptance is superior
to default monitoring in terms of speed (since it requires fewer resources) and
power (since it results more often in formation of testimonial beliefs).
But can the contextually-triggered monitoring permitted by the default
acceptance policy account for the difference between the base rate and our
actual reliability? It appears likely that the policy can in fact account for this.
With an eye to explaining the lack of variation in detection accuracy between
individuals and across studies, Levine (2010) argues that there are “a few
transparent liars”, liars whose behaviour makes it so easy to determine that
they are lying that the recipient can easily do this, while most communicators
are not transparent liars. (Transparency can be affected by situational factors,
not only communicator ability, so that the same communicator might be more
or less transparent in different contexts.) This suggests that we can explain
the fact that we do slightly better than chance at detecting deception as the
10Sperber et al. (2010) argue that some of the information required for detection of deception is
necessarily acquired in the course of interpretation of communication. But this only goes so far
in cutting down the cost of monitoring for dishonesty—meaningful monitoring will clearly require
cognitive resources beyond those required for mere comprehension of an utterance. And even
where the information is available, resources will still be required to do something with it.
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result not of always-on monitoring but rather as the result of monitoring that
is occasionally triggered by the unusual behaviour of the communicator. Of
course, this means that recipients need to have some degree of sensitivity
to the cues provided by transparent liars, but this is compatible with the
default acceptance policy. The behaviour of transparent liars can make it
apparent to receivers that they are lying, even if receivers do not employ a
monitoring process dedicated to detecting cues: there need be no system 1
monitoring process employed by default; instead, unusual behaviour by the
communicator induces the receiver to consciously monitor her; and this system
2 monitoring, once engaged, sometimes permits lie-detection. This proposal
is broadly consistent with Thagard’s default-and-trigger model of testimonial
belief-formation (Thagard 2006), which distinguishes a default pathway of
automatic acceptance of communicated information and a reflective pathway
of reflective evaluation based on explanatory coherence; the default pathway
is used unless incoherence of the content or lack of credibility of the source
triggers use of the reflective pathway.
It thus seems likely that A4 is incorrect, and thus that the second version of
Sperber’s argument also fails. If so, vigilantism about testimony is untenable:
monitoring cannot play the sort of role assigned to it by Fricker and Sperber.
5 Towards Vigilantism About Memory
It is intuitively plausible that testimony, as an external source, requires mon-
itoring by the agent, since communicators will often have an incentive to
deceive the agent, while memory, as an internal source, does not require such
monitoring, since it is designed to serve the agent’s interests. We have seen
that the first half of this line is mistaken: a stance of default monitoring is
neither normatively appropriate nor actually employed by agents with respect
to testimony. In this section, focussing on episodic memory, I argue that the
second half of the line is also mistaken: while memory is indeed designed to
serve the agent’s interests, this does not mean that it functions to provide the
agent with mostly accurate information; in fact, it provides the agent with a
great deal of inaccurate information, and, consequently, a stance of default
monitoring is both normatively appropriate and actually employed by agents
with respect to memory. In other words, while vigilantism is incorrect with
respect to testimony, a form of vigilantism is correct with respect to memory.
5.1 Endorsement Problems
According to a simple, intuitively plausible picture of the operation of mem-
ory,11 records are placed in memory when the subject endorses (believes)
11I draw here on Clark and Chalmers’ paper on the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and
Chalmers 1998), discussed more fully in Michaelian (2012d), but this sort of picture is implicit
in many philosophical discussions of memory (e.g., Burge 1993).
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them; records are discrete, stable items, remaining unchanged while in memory
and unchanged during retrieval; and records are endorsed (believed) automat-
ically upon retrieval. On this “preservationist” view (not to be confused with
preservationism about memory justification (Lackey 2008)), the function of
memory is simply to preserve the agent’s beliefs.
If preservationism is right, then, assuming that memory performs its func-
tion well, vigilantism is clearly incorrect with respect to memory, both de-
scriptively and normatively. Descriptively: assuming that the agent’s other
belief-forming processes are reliable, there is no advantage to be gained by
monitoring one’s own memory for signs of “deception”. Normatively: making
the same assumption, the agent will be entitled simply to trust information
received from memory, for doing so is a reliable belief-forming (or belief-
preserving) process. The problem is that preservationism is false. (I here rely
on work done elsewhere (Michaelian 2011a, 2012d)—space does not permit
reviewing my argument against preservationism in detail).
First, memory does not store only endorsed representations, and represen-
tations are not endorsed automatically at retrieval. Storage is determined by
a form of relevance (where this covers a range of factors, including depth of
processing Craik 2002), with the consequence that relevant but non-endorsed
records are stored. As non-endorsed representations are stored, representa-
tions are not endorsed automatically at retrieval: endorsement at retrieval is
determined by a range of metamemory processes (Michaelian 2012c; Hertwig
et al. 2008; Mitchell and Johnson 2009). The key point is that retrieval is
a two-level process—memory is a metacognitive belief-producing system. In
terms of MEF: the memory store is the information source; metamemory
processes monitor retrieval (process and retrieved content) and determine
endorsement/rejection.
Second, a form of metacognition is required also due to the constructive
character of memory. Memory records are not discrete, stable items but rather
are transformed by a variety of broadly inferential processes during encoding,
consolidation, retrieval, and reconsolidation following retrieval (Dudai 2004;
Koriat et al. 2000; Loftus 2005; McClelland 2011; Schacter and Addis 2007).
The upshot is that retrieval from memory can in fact mean the production of a
new representation, a representation that was not previously stored in memory
or even previously entertained by the agent. Thus the agent requires some
means of determining whether to endorse this newly-produced representation.
Indeed, while it was for a long time standard to refer to a dedicated episodic
memory system (Michaelian 2011b), the current tendency is to view episodic
remembering rather as one function of a system capable of engaging in a
broader range of constructive functions—either of a system devoted to “men-
tal time travel” into both past and future (Tulving 1993) or, more radically,
of a more general construction system (Hassabis and Maguire 2009). Even on
the MTT approach, there is reason to take imagination of future events to be
the primary function of the system: as Suddendorf and Corbalis argue, “our
ability to revisit the past may be only a design feature of our ability to conceive
of the future” (Suddendorf 2007, p. 303). And there is evidence (Spreng et al.
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2009) that episodic remembering should be viewed as one activity of a system
devoted not only to mental time travel but to a range of forms of imaginative
construction of possible situations. Hassabis and Maguire (2009) argue that
episodic memory is one of a number of different forms of “scene construction”,
including not only episodic future thinking but also navigation, theory of mind,
mind wandering, and imagining fictitious experiences, which rely on the same
brain network. The key point, for present purposes, is that on either the
MTT hypothesis or the construction system hypothesis, the same system is
responsible for the production of representations not only of the agent’s past
experiences but also of other possible experiences. Thus it is not only due to
storage of non-endorsed information that remembering requires metacogni-
tion, but also because the agent requires some means of determining whether
he is remembering or, rather, engaged in some other form of construction.
Thus, agents require some means of determining when to trust internally-
generated representations, both because remembering must be distinguished
from other constructive processes (including imagination) and because memo-
ries originating in experience must be distinguished from memories originating
in other sources (imagination, etc.). As Urmson points out (Urmson 1967) (see
also Bernecker 2008), it is important to distinguish these two questions: How
do we manage to determine whether we are remembering rather than imag-
ining? How do we manage to determine whether we are remembering suc-
cessfully (accurately) rather than unsuccessfully? Distinguishing these ques-
tions, we can see that the remembering agent faces a double “endorsement
problem”: (1) the agent faces the task of distinguishing between remembering
and other, related constructive processes—the process problem; (2) the agent
faces the task of distinguishing between memories originating in experience
and memories originating in other sources—the source problem.12 Reliable
formation of memory beliefs presupposes solving both the source problem and
the process problem.
We can see the need for an explanation of how the agent manages to
perform these tasks because, while we reliably manage to determine both the
source of remembered information and whether we are remembering rather
than engaging in some other form of construction, failure sometimes occurs
for each task. My claim is that two similar but distinct forms of metacognition
are responsible for solving these related problems: process monitoring allows
the agent to determine whether she is remembering or engaging in some
other form of construction; source monitoring allows the agent to distinguish
between memories originating in experience and memories originating in other
sources.
Source monitoring failures can, e.g., account for the misinformation effect
(Michaelian 2012b; Loftus 2005; Lindsay 1994), in which post-event informa-
tion is incorporated into the agent’s memory representation of a witnessed
12In both the source problem and the process problem, there might be intermediate/indeterminate
cases; I set these aside here.
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event. Similarly, it is plausible that source monitoring failures account for
some cases of imagination inflation, in which imagining an event increases
confidence that it occurred (Garry et al. 1996).
The possibility of process monitoring failures was already noted by Hume:
And as an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may
degenerate to such a degree, as to be taken for an idea of the imagination;
so on the other hand an idea of the imagination may acquire such force
and vivacity, so as to pass for an idea of the memory. (Hume 1739)
Note that, read in the most straightforward manner, Hume does not seem to be
saying that an agent can take himself to be remembering an experience when
in fact he is remembering something imagined (and vice versa), but rather that
an agent can take himself to be remembering when in fact he is imagining (and
vice versa). Failures of process monitoring resulting in taking imagining for
remembering might be involved in such phenomena as delusions (Currie and
Ravenscroft 2002), false recovered memories (Lindsay and Don Read 2005;
Johnson et al. 2012), or discovery misattribution, in which the experience of
solving a problem is confused with remembering (Dougal and Schooler 2007).
Failures going in the other direction might be behind phenomena such as
cryptomnesia (Brown and Murphy 1989; Marsh et al. 1997; Brédart et al. 2003).
Regardless of the details, the occurrence of both types of error make it clear
that there is a fallible mechanism at work in process monitoring just as much
as in source monitoring, that the type of the process that is unfolding is not
automatically and transparently given to the agent as part of its unfolding.
5.2 The Role of Metacognition: Process Monitoring
The philosophical literature on memory and imagination contains a number of
suggestions that can be read as proposals about how agents solve the process
problem;13 these can be conveniently grouped into formal, content-based, and
phenomenological solutions.
5.2.1 Formal Solutions
Formal solutions to the process problem claim that remembering is distin-
guished from imagining on the basis of structural features, either of the
processes themselves or of the representations that they produce.
Flexibility In addition to his content-based solution (see Section 5.2.2), Hume
(1739) suggests that memory and imagination can be distinguished on the basis
of their relative flexiblity; the suggestion is, roughly, that whereas imagination
flexibly recombines aspects of experience, memory is bound to preserve their
13I draw here on Bernecker’s helpful discussion of memory markers in Bernecker (2008), noting
where my approach overlaps with his.
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original arrangement. However, as Bernecker points out (Bernecker 2008),
the flexibility criterion is not usable, since the original experience cannot be
compared to the present representation. Perhaps more seriously, the flexibility
criterion fails to take the recontructive nature of remembering (Section 5.1
above) into account.
Intention On the approach advocated by Urmson (1967), the goal set by the
agent determines the nature of the process: if the agent’s goal in constructing
a representation is to produce a representation of a past experience, then
he is remembering; otherwise (if the construction is not so constrained), he
is imagining. As Urmson puts it, “[w]e can infallibly determine whether we
are recollecting or imagining simply by choosing” (Urmson 1967, p. 89–90).
This proposal faces a number of problems. First, it makes error essentially
impossible. On this proposal, unless the agent has a mistaken belief about what
she wants to do, she cannot be in error about whether she is remembering or
imagining. But presumably error is possible even where the agent does not
have a mistaken belief about what she wants to do. Consider the case discussed
by Martin and Deutscher of an agent who paints a scene that he takes himself
to be imagining but who is mistaken about this—in fact, he is remembering
a scene that he saw long ago, though he does not know that he is doing so
(Martin and Deutscher 1966). Second, it ignores involuntary remembering.
Remembering is not always (or even usually) voluntary (Hintzman 2011). On
Urmson’s proposal, the subject cannot know whether she is remembering or
imagining unless she has first decided whether she is remembering or imagin-
ing. But it seems that the subject should be able to determine what she is doing
even in cases of involuntary remembering. Finally, it overintellectualizes, by
requiring the subject to have criteria for success in mind.
Voluntariness Furlong (1948, 1951) develops an approach according to which
memory and imagination can be distinguished by their relative voluntariness:
basically, while imagining is voluntary, memory is said to be involuntary.
However, this proposal ignores both voluntary remembering and much mind
wandering, which can be seen as a form of involuntary imagining.
5.2.2 Content-Based Solutions
Hume’s other proposal for how the process problem is solved is that re-
membering is distinguished from imagining by its greater force and vivacity
(Hume 1739). Though Bernecker refers to this as a “phenomenal” criterion,
he reads the proposal as referring essentially to a supposed difference in the
level of detail in the representations produced respectively by memory and
imagination (Bernecker 2008). A similar proposal, on which memory can be
distinguished from imagination by its greater level of contextual information,
is entertained by Russell (1921). However, as Sutton points out (Sutton 1998),
Hume himself undermines this proposal by pointing out that memory need
not involve greater force and vivacity; nor is it clear that memory on average
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involves greater force and vivacity. Additionally, the content-based proposal
does not appear to be able to distinguish between mental time travel into the
past and mental time travel into the future (a point already discussed by Reid
1764), since the level of detail in representations of past and future events
varies in a similar way. Finally, the content-based solution seems unlikely to be
able to account for cases of what we might term “embedded construction”—
level of detail seems unlikely to be able to distinguish among remembering
remembering, imagining remembering, and so on (Bernecker 2008).
5.2.3 Phenomenological Solutions
A proposal modelled on the source monitoring framework (see Section 5.3)
avoids these problems for formal and content-based approaches. Hume re-
marks that “[a]n idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the
fancy alone presents to us” (Hume 1739). If we take Hume literally here, the
suggestion would seem to be that, rather than being distinguished by their
structure or content, remembering and imagining are distinguished by the
different feelings that accompany the processes. Similar suggestions concern-
ing phenomenological differences between remembering and imagining are
made by a number of other theorists. James (1890) refers to feelings of warmth,
intimacy, and the past direction of time. Russell (1921) refers to feelings of
pastness and familiarity; similarly, a feeling of familiarity is referred to by
Broad (1925), while Plantinga (1993) refers to a feeling of pastness.14
Developing the phenomenological solution, my basic proposal is that the
type of the constructive cognitive process is determined using heuristics that go
either from properties of the representation produced by the process or from
phenomenal features of the process itself to judgements about the type of the
process. It is implausible that process monitoring can rely on content alone,
simply because imagination is often used to produce representations that are
indistinguishable from those produced by memory, as far as their content
is concerned, both intrinsically (level of detail, etc.) and in terms of their
relation to other representations (coherence). Source monitoring, in contrast,
can avoid this difficulty while relying entirely on features of content because
it is concerned with distinguishing memory for imagination from memory
for experience, and because the memory of an imagined representation will
normally include information about the cognitive operations responsible for
its production; but the representation produced by imagination itself does not
include such information, so process monitoring cannot exploit this. It is thus
more likely that process monitoring relies (primarily) on phenomenology.
I will not try to develop this suggestion in detail here, but it is plausible that
there are phenomenal differences between the various forms of construction,
14Making a different sort of phenomenological proposal, Audi (1995) suggests that remembering
is distinguished from imagining by a feeling of having believed; since memory both stores non-
endorsed representations and is capable of producing new representations and beliefs, however,
this proposal is a non-starter.
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and that these can be used to determine (reliably, but not infallibly) the type
of construction to which a given process belongs. One way this might work:
In contrast to the mere episodic-like or what-where-when memory possessed
by some animals (Suddendorf 2007; Roberts and Feeney 2009), true episodic
memory involves a distinctive phenomenology, a sense of subjective time
(Tulving 1983; Nyberg et al. 2010). This phenomenology is shared by mental
time travel into to the future (Boyer 2008). So episodic remembering can be
distinguished from episodic future thinking in terms of the directionality of
the sense of subjective time that they involve—I have the sense that this is
something that has happened to me, or I have the sense that this is something
that will happen to me. And imagination can be distinguished from MTT
in general because it does not normally involve the same sort of sense of
subjective time. These discriminations are presumably accomplished by type
1 processes, so that the agent is not aware of making them. A complete
story, of course, will have to explain also how the agent can distinguish
between memory or imagination and other forms of construction; my aim
here is, modestly, to make plausible the suggestion that, drawing on empirical
work on phenomenological differences between remembering and imagining
(D’Argembeau and Van der Linden 2004, 2006; Gamboz et al. 2010; de Vito
et al. 2012), a process monitoring framework analogous to the source monitor-
ing framework can be developed.
5.3 The Role of Metacognition: Source Monitoring
The suggestion that source monitoring solves the second half of the en-
dorsement problem is similarly speculative, though better supported. Because
we cannot establish the base rate of accurate representations produced by
memory (P(T)) with much precision, and because we similarly cannot es-
tablish the reliability of source monitoring (P(H|T) and P(∼ H| ∼ T)) with
much precision, we cannot determine the reliability of remembering with any
precision. But since the assumption that memory is reliable is safe (Michaelian
2012b), and since the source monitoring framework, which is itself grounded
in a developed body of theory and research on metamemory processes (see
Mitchell and Johnson 2009, for a recent review), was designed in part precisely
to provide an explanation of how memory can be reliable despite the poor
reliability of retrieval, the framework does suggest that source monitoring
solves the problem.
Source monitoring theorists argue that we are able to discriminate the
origins of mental experiences by means of attributional judgements processes,
evaluative or monitoring processes which take us from properties of retrieved
information (and, in certain cases, features of its relation to other memories)
to a judgement that the information stems from a certain source (and thus
is or is not likely to be veridical) (Mitchell and Johnson 2000, p. 180). Though
memory does not normally store information about source, memories typically
bear characteristic marks of the sources in which they originate; for example,
“memories of imagined events typically have less vivid perceptual, temporal,
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and spatial information than perceived events and often include information
about intentional cognitive operations . . . ”, while “[m]emories of dreams are
often perceptually vivid, typically do not include information about the cogni-
tive operations that created them, and are often inconsistent with knowledge
or other memories” (Mitchell and Johnson 2000, p. 180). The presence of
these marks means that though information about the source of a record is
not typically stored along with the record itself, it is nevertheless possible to
determine the source of a record with some reliability, using “heuristic source
monitoring processes to attribute a source to information based on an eval-
uation of various features of the information” (Johnson and Raye 2000, p. 39).
Source monitoring is normally a type 1 process, unconscious and automatic
(Mitchell and Johnson 2000; Johnson and Raye 2000), though it can also be
performed by type 2 processes. Thus, in terms of MEF, the source monitoring
framework suggests that the endorsement policy that agents employ with
respect to their own memories is analogous to the default monitoring policy
that vigilantists incorrectly take them to employ with respect to testimony.
5.4 The Contributions of the Base Rate and Monitoring in Memory
Given the points about endorsement and construction, we are entitled to
assumptions analogous to those required by Fricker and Sperber (on the first
reading):
A1-M Inaccurate memories are frequent, as are representations produced by
imagination but which could be mistaken for memories, so that accept-
ing apparent memories without monitoring would lead to unreliable
belief-formation.
If the source monitoring framework and the process monitoring framework
are on the right track, then we are also entitled to assume:
A2-M Reliable cues to accuracy (to whether the representation is a memory
and, if so, which source it originates in) exist.
A3-M Subjects can and do exploit these cues to monitor effectively for
inaccuracy.
These assumptions ground a form of vigilantism about memory. Descriptively:
in order for memory to be sufficiently reliable to be beneficial, agents must be
epistemically vigilant with respect to remembered information. Normatively:
We are not entitled simply to trust our memories but must monitor memory
for accuracy.
6 Conclusions
One might object that it is a mistake to oppose trust to vigilance, as I have
done here, that, rather than being opposed to vigilance, trust is in fact based on
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vigilance. Drawing on work by Origgi (2004, 2010, 2012), Sperber et al. suggest
precisely this sort of view, which they illustrate using the following analogy:
When we walk down a street through a crowd of people, many at very
close quarters, there is a constant risk of inadvertent or even intentional
collision. Still, we trust people in the street, and have no hesitation
about walking among them. Nor is it just a matter of expecting others to
take care while we ourselves walk carelessly. We monitor the trajectory
of others, and keep an eye out for the occasional absentminded or
aggressive individual, automatically adjusting our level of vigilance to
the surroundings. Most of the time, it is low enough to be unconscious
and not to detract, say, from the pleasure of a stroll, but it rises when
the situation requires. Our mutual trust in the street is largely based on
our mutual vigilance. Similarly, in communication, it is not that we can
generally be trustful and therefore need to be vigilant only in rare and
special circumstances. We could not be mutually trustful unless we were
mutually vigilant. (Sperber et al. 2010, 364)
While the thought that trust is based on vigilance is seductive, I believe that
this analogy does not do the work that Sperber et al. want it to do.
In a crowd of pedestrians, each person is normally trying to avoid colliding
with others—their interests, as far as collisions are concerned, coincide. But
the appeal of vigilantism about testimony relies precisely on the fact that,
in communication, the interests of communicator and receiver often do not
coincide: whereas it is unusual for someone to attempt to collide with you,
it is supposed to be an ordinary or even a frequent occurrence for someone
to attempt to deceive you. Vigilance with respect to pedestrian collisions
when walking thus is not analogous to vigilance with respect to deception in
communication in the manner that Sperber et al. suggest. In the pedestrian
case, it makes sense to say that trust is based on vigilance: we trust each
other because each of us knows that the others are vigilant; but what it is to
be vigilant in this context is precisely to try not to collide. There is nothing
analogous in the testimony case, as vigilantism conceives of it: there, each of us
must be vigilant precisely because others are trying to “collide” with us; here,
trust is not based on vigilance.
The analogy can be reworked: The vigilance we exercise in communication
is, if the approach developed here is right, indeed analogous to the vigilance
we exercise when walking in a crowd of pedestrians, but not in the way that
Sperber et al. suggest. When we walk down the street, we mostly trust others
not to collide with us, just as we mostly try not to collide with others; we
do not need to devote significant resources to monitoring for others who are
attempting to collide with us, but rather concern ourselves with controlling our
own trajectory so that we do not collide with them. Occasionally, however,
unusual behaviour causes us to consciously take deliberate steps to avoid a
collision—when someone appears to be drunk or aggressive, for example,
we might begin to monitor his trajectory in order to determine whether he
is likely to collide with us. When this happens, we can usually avoid the
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potential collision, by withdrawing our default trust and steering clear of
him if necessary. Things are, I claim, similar in communication. When we
exchange information with others, we mostly trust them to tell us the truth,
just as we mostly try to tell the truth to them; we do not need to devote
significant resources to monitoring for attempts to deceive us, but rather con-
cern ourselves with giving accurate information when we testify. Occasionally,
however, unusual behaviour causes us to consciously take deliberate steps
to avoid being deceived—when someone is suddenly extremely nervous, for
example, we might begin to monitor him to attempt to determine whether he
is lying to us. My suggestion is that in such situations, we usually manage to
avoid being deceived: we withdraw our default trust in the communicator and
attempt to determine whether he is indeed lying, and evaluations made under
these circumstances are reliable.
Things are, I have argued, different as far as memory is concerned—we
should invert the vigilantist line. This inversion is correct both descriptively
and normatively: descriptively, because monitoring of testimony is limited
and ineffective, while the construction system is monitored regularly and
effectively; normatively, because, while social metacognition is relatively
ineffective, individual metacognition is relatively effective. While counterintu-
itive, this inversion in the end should perhaps not be surprising, as agents will
normally have much better information about their own cognitive operations
than they do about those of others.
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